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BALANCING PRIVATE LOSS AGAINST
PUBLIC GAIN TO TEST FOR A VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS OR A TAKING
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION
In the continuing effort to develop manageable rules for determin-
ing the constitutionality of land use regulations that diminish private
rights in property, various courts have balanced private loss against
public gain to test for two different constitutional violations, taking of
private property without just compensation' and deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law.2 Although it is often ignored, the dis-
tinction between these violations is essential because a taking without
compensation 3 can be corrected by payment whereas a violation of
due process4 requires invalidation of the government action. 5
1. See cases cited in note 54 infra. For example, in Department of Ecology v. Pace-
setter Constr. Co., 89 Wn. 2d 203, 207, 571 P.2d 196, 198 (1977), the Washington Su-
preme Court upheld the use of the "so-called test of balancing private loss against public
gain" to determine whether the denial of a building permit under the Shoreline Manage-
ment Act of 1971, WASH. Rev. CODE ch. 90.58 (1976), to prevent view blockage and aes-
thetic degradation along the shore of Lake Washington, constituted an unconstitutional
taking or damaging of private property without just compensation. The trial court had
based its holding of no taking on the finding that the "drastic effect upon the
neighborhood and the effect upon the neighbors is a much greater loss socially and gen-
erally than the loss to one owner in requiring him to restrict his use in a manner that will
not cause deterioration of the present conditions of the shoreline." Pacesetter, 89 Wn.
2d at 208, 571 P.2d at 199. The landowner, Pacesetter, contended that this balancing
test was unsound because it failed to distinguish between a regulation requiring com-
pensation as a taking and a regulation supportable by the police power requiring no
compensation. Id. at 210, 571 P.2d at 200. The court simply replied: "This criticism,
however, has not served to change the view of the majority of the courts which accept the
balancing test." Id.
In a concurring opinion two justices limited their acceptance of the balancing test: "I
do want, however, to make it absolutely clear that the balancing test does have limits.
There is, and must be, a point beyond which the interference with the rights of property
ownership may not constitutionally go without just compensation regardless of the pub-
lic interest." Id. at 216, 571 P.2d at 203 (Wright, CJ., and Hicks, J., concurring).
The court carefully avoided relying solely on the balancing test and noted that the
landowner's reciprocal benefits from the same restriction on his neighbors' property re-
duced the value diminution to within permissible limits. Id. at 211-12, 571 P.2d at 200.
See note 13 infra (discussion of the reciprocal benefits doctrine).
2. See cases cited in note 54 infra. For clear examples of this use of the balancing
test, see note 100 infra.
3. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, which is enforceable
against the states via the fourteenth amendment, provides: "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation."
4. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
5. See text accompanying notes 50-53 infra.
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Many commentators have tackled the problem of developing a
coherent theory of constitutional limitations on taking private prop-
erty rights, with perplexingly little success.3 There is no consensus on
the proper role for the test of balancing private loss against public
gain. 7 This comment examines only that one narrow aspect of the
larger theoretical problem.
The first part of this comment examines the test of balancing pri-
vate loss against public gain to establish the conceptual basis for ana-
lyzing its proper uses. The test is shown to require that land use regu-
lations serve the general welfare and that the public benefits alone,
without consideration of incidental private benefits, be sufficient to
justify the burdens placed on private property.
Part II presents the essential characteristics of the due process and
taking without compensation limitations as they have been construed
by the United States Supreme Court and developed by other courts
and commentators. It is shown that the prevailing approach to the
taking issue, which allows some private property rights to be dimin-
ished without compensation, requires two distinct constitutional limi-
tations on state action. One provides a check on arbitrary or improper
action whether or not compensation is required, and the other limits
the permissible reduction of property rights without compensation.
Finally, Part III examines the justification in United States Su-
preme Court precedent and legal theory for either use of this test. It
resolves the conflicting interpretations of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
6. E.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, &J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as F. BOSSELMAN]; W. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT Do-
MAIN (1977): Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165
(1974); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149 (1971); Sax.
Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964); Van Alstyne. Taking or Damag-
ing by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
1 (197 1). Additional sources are cited in note 7 infra.
7. For authors who support the use of balancing private loss against public gain as a
test for a taking without just compensation, see Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Do-
main-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596, 609-10, 626-29 (1954); Kusler,
Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or Invalid Taking, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1. 5. 12, 20.
21, 63 (1972): Netherton, Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power vs. Emi-
nent Domain, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33. 42-50 (1968); Plater. The Takings Issue in
a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEX. L. REV. 201, 203, 222-23
(1974); Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort, 38
WASH. L. REV. 607, 613-19 (1963).
For authors who argue that the balancing test is unsound as a test for a taking but
should be used only to test for "minimal rationality" or "public purpose," see P. BROWN,
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, THE TAKING ISSUE
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 17-20 (1975); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165. 1193-96 (1967).
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Mahon8 and shows that balancing private loss against public gain
should be used only to test for a violation of due process and not for a
taking without compensation.
I. BALANCING PRIVATE LOSS AGAINST PUBLIC GAIN
AS A FORM OF SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Balancing private loss against public gain is one form of a broader
analytic process which the Model Land Development Code calls bal-
ancing detriments and benefits.!' This analytic process measures
changes in aggregate welfare by comparing all the benefits with all the
detriments of a proposed action in a cost-benefit analysis performed
from the perspective of society as a whole. The gains and losses may
be combined and compared in many different ways, allowing many
possible formulations.' 0 Regardless of the formulation used, however,
two essential features of this social cost-benefit analysis allow it to be
identified even in the murkiest opinions.
First, the factors considered on each side must be sufficiently simi-
lar that they can, at least subjectively, be added and subtracted on the
same mental scale.' 1 Second, all effects on all individuals in society
must be considered.' 2 Many individual effects can be considered in
the aggregate, but each effect must be counted only once. The effect
8. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
9. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 7-401 (1976) ("Balance of Detriments and
Benefits"). The drafters of the code apparently chose this term rather than cost-benefit to
avoid the implication that the benefits and detriments should be valued in monetary
terms as is often attempted in cost-benefit analyses. For a discussion of the problems
and misunderstandings created by valuating nonquantifiable effects in monetary terms,
see Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1092, 1098-1106, 1111-14 (1972).
10. Possible formulations include the following: (1) all gains minus all losses equals
change in welfare, (2) public gains plus private gains exceed public losses plus private
losses, and (3) public gains minus public losses exceed private losses minus private
gains. For examples of judicial use of various formulations of social cost-benefit analy-
sis, see note 15 infra.
II. The Model Land Development Code provides: "Detriments or benefits shall not
be denied consideration on the ground that they are indirect, intangible or not readily
quantifiable." MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 7-402 (1976). The comments add:
"[C] onsideration should not be limited only to those factors that can be easily trans-
lated into dollar figures. The long-range social and environmental effect of develop-
ment may be of far greater importance than any immediately measurable costs or bene-
fits." Id., Reporter's Note at 284. The land use agency is required to give its "opinion"
whether the benefits outbalance the detriments. Id. §§ 7-401, -402, Reporter's Note,
Illustrations (a)-(b).
12. If the benefit or burden for any individual is left out, the test no longer mea-
sures aggregate social welfare. See Michelman, supra note 7, at 1194.
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of pollution on the polluters themselves can be either counted with
other societal effects, or subtracted from benefits on the polluters' side
of the balance.' 3
When all the effects on all individuals are considered in a form
which allows them to be added and subtracted, the sum of these ef-
fects is a measurement of the change in aggregate welfare.' 4 Social
cost-benefit analysis determines whether a given state action serves
the general welfare and, therefore, whether it is socially desirable. ' 5
In the usual situation, when no private parties receive special bene-
fits from a land use regulation,' 6 the test of balancing private loss
against public gain is simply one possible formulation of social cost-
benefit analysis. But in the case in which private persons receive inci-
dental benefits, ' 7 the test of balancing private loss against public gain
13. The net burden on the individual must be compared with the net benefit for the
rest of society rather than all of society. otherwise the effects on the individual are
counted twice. For a different approach to the importance of separating the individuals
from society in examining the gains, see Michelman. supra note 7. at 1194-95. If re-
stricted landowners receive benefits from the same restrictions on surrounding prop-
erty. these benefits must be subtracted from their burdens before comparing their loss to
the public gain. This concept of reciprocal benefits is often used to justify the burdens
imposed by land use restrictions. E.g., HFH Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. 15 Cal. 3d 508. 520-21. 542 P.2d 237. 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365. 374 11975).
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976): Rochester Business Inst. v. City of Rochester, 25 App.
Div. 2d 97, 267 N.Y.S.2d 274. 279 (1966): Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr.
Co.. 89 Wn. 2d 203,210-211,571 P.2d 196. 20011977).
14. Professor Michelman uses the label "efficiency" to refer to changes in aggregate
welfare: "An *efficient' process is one which maximizes the total amount of welfare.
Michelman. supra note 7, at 1173. For a complete exploration of the concept, see
id. at 1173 83. Michelman suggests that balancing private loss against public gain is an
appropriate test of the minimal requirement that all state actions be efficient. Id. at
1195-96.
15. Social cost-benefit analysis has many useful legal applications. A common ex-
ample from negligence law is the Learned Hand formula for determining the reason-
ableness of a risk by comparing the burdens on the actor of avoiding the risk with the
probable benefits for society. United States v. Carroll Towing Co.. 159 F.2d 169 (2nd
Cir. 1947). See W. PROSSER. TORTS 149 (4th ed. 197 1). Another example is the Supreme
Court's balancing of the burden on interstate commerce against the benefits to a state
from a train safety law. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761
(1945). When a nuisance is caused by an adjoining land use, social cost-benefit analysis
should be used to limit the remedy to damages when an injunction would place a greater
burden on the defendants and society than the resulting benefits to the plaintiffs. See
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219. 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 720-21 (1973).
16. For a discussion of the problem of distinguishing private from public benefits,
see note 34 infra.
17. For example, in Pennyslvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). there
were large benefits to the homeowner Mahon and only small benefits to the public. See
notes 60-62 and accompanying text infra. Another example is Department of Ecology
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is stricter than other forms of social cost-benefit analysis, because it
requires that the public benefits alone, without consideration of the
private benefits, be sufficient to justify the private losses.' 8 If this re-
quirement is satisfied, any incidental benefits to private parties will
only further increase the aggregate social welfare. The test of balanc-
ing private loss against public gain therefore requires not only an in-
crease in aggregate welfare but also satisfaction of this minimal public
benefit requirement.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON DIMINISHING
PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PROPERTY
Balancing private loss against public gain has been used to test for
both a deprivation of property without due process and a taking of
property without just compensation.' 9 Before the propriety of either
use can be explored, the two constitutional limitations, which are eas-
ily confused, must be clearly understood and distinguished.
A. Deprivation of Property Without Due Process of Law
In addition to creating procedural requirements, the words "due
process" have been construed by the United States Supreme Court to
create certain substantive limitations on government action. 20 Al-
though the possibility of strict review of all governmental actions un-
der this doctrine has been limited by the Supreme Court, interpreta-
tions of the due process clause have consistently maintained that all
governmental actions must meet certain minimal standards of propri-
ety.21
v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wn. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977), discussed in note I su-
pra.
18. The plain meaning of the words indicates that the test considers only the public
benefits, and, in any case, state action cannot be justified by private gain.
19. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
20. "[T] he substantive content of the Clause is suggested neither by its language
nor by preconstitutional history; that content is nothing more than the accumulated pro-
duct of judicial interpretation of [the due process clause in] the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543-44 (1977) (White,
J., dissenting).
21. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 450-51 (1978). However, some
cases have mandated a strict standard of review under substantive due process to pro-
tect certain fundamental rights. See generally id. at 564-75. Some of the fundamental
rights that Supreme Court Justices have listed as requiring special protection by strict
judicial scrutiny are the rights of voting, association, access to courts, and certain rights
to privacy. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974). This strict scrutiny ap-
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This minimal requirement of substantive due process is often ex-
pressed as the limitation that laws must not be "unnecessary," "unrea-
sonable," "irrational," "arbitrary," or "capricious. -"2 2 Many courts
express the same constitutional limitation as a general requirement of
"reasonableness" without citing a specific constitutional source.2 3 The
minimal requirements of substantive due process are often applied
through the "means-ends test."2 4 This requires that (1) the legislative
objectives must serve a valid public purpose within the powers of the
legislature, and (2) the means employed must bear a rational relation-
ship to the achievement of those objectives.25 This standard embodies
a strong deference to the judgment of the legislature2 6 in accordance
with the principle of separation of powers.
proach for fundamental rights was recently extended to reach land use regulations which
infringe certain family rights. Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (in-
validating a zoning restriction which limited the family members who could live to-
gether).
22. Nashville. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters. 294 U.S. 405. 413. 415 (1935) (arbitrary
or unreasonable): Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge. 278 U.S. 116.
121-22 (1928) (unnecessary, unreasonable, arbitrary. or capricious): Nectow v. City of
Cambridge. 277 U.S. 183. 187-88 (1928) (arbitrary or irrational); Smoke Rise. Inc. v.
Washington Suburban San. Comm'n. 400 F. Supp. 1369, 1383 (D. Md. 1975)
(reasonable). These are all land use cases.
23. E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead. 369 U.S. 590. 594 (1962): lzaak Walton
League of America v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698. 708 (D. Minn. 1973). rev'd, 497 F.2d
849 (8th Cir. 1974): Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.H. 71, 95 A.2d 122. 124-26 (1953):
State v. Dexter, 32 Wn. 2d 551. 560-62. 202 P.2d 906. 910- 11 (1949). aff'd per curian,
338 U.S. 863 (1949). These are all land use cases.
24. E.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494. 548 (1977) ("No case that I
know of ... has announced that there is some legislation with respect to which there no
longer exists a means-ends test as a matter of substantive due process law-) (White. J..
dissenting).
25. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 410
(1978).
26. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri. 342 U.S. 421 (1952): Zahn v. Board of
Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325. 328 (1927). Within this standard the degree of deference for
both the ends and the means seems to vary with the type of case. In land use cases defer-
ence by the U.S. Supreme Court to the legislative judgment of objectives is very broad.
Practically any conceivable public purpose will be sustained. Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26. 31-33 (1954), and the Court will presume that a public purpose exists if no spe-
cific evidence is presented, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
("No doubt there is a public interest even in this, as there is in . .. all that happens
within the commonwealth").
Judicial deference to the legislative judgment of the means is less broad. In Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183. 188 (1928). the Court overruled the judgment of the
local zoning authorities on the proper location of a zoning boundary because it could
see no reason not to relocate it and the master below found that its present location did
not promote the general welfare.
Although the requisite relationship between the means and the ends is often labeled
"substantial." Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Village of Eu-
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In the context of land use regulation, the essential idea of the mini-
mal substantive due process limitation is that while all individuals in
society must yield some of their property rights without compensation
for the good of all, these rights can be taken only by governmental ac-
tions which pass certain minimal standards of propriety.
B. Taking Private Property for Public Use Without Just
Compensation
The fifth amendment's prohibition against taking private property
for public use without just compensation has been incorporated by in-
terpretations of the United States Supreme Court into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to make it enforceable against
the states as well as the federal government.27 Although the protection
for private property is expressed in absolute terms, "[g] overnment
hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident to property
could not be diminished"28 by regulation without compensation. But
"if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.' '2 9 Both
courts and scholars have struggled with the problem of determining
when a landowner must be compensated, but as yet there is no con-
sensus on either general principles or appropriate rules for deciding
cases.
30
clid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926), the present Supreme Court sees
this as the same as the requirement of a "rational" relationship, Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 n.6 (1977) (articulating the requirement of a "rational"
relationship while quoting the requirement of a "substantial" relationship from an ear-
lier case). If the legislative judgment of this relationship is even debatably valid, it will
not be disturbed. Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). In a more recent land use case,
the Supreme Court quoted a formulation from 1894: "[I t must appear . . .that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose." Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133, 137 (1894)).
27. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Chicago B. & 0. R. Co.
v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233 (1897). State constitutions also require that com-
pensation accompany the taking of property. E.g., WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16 ("No pri-
vate property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compen-
sation").
28. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
29. Id. at 415.
30. Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1-3. Contemporary courts often consider a
diversity of factors developed by both courts and academicians. For example, in a re-
cent Washington case upholding uncompensated flood plain restrictions, the court con-
sidered eleven different factors: (I) valid legislative objective, (2) not a public improve-
ment, (3) no flowage easement sought, (4) no property interest acquired, (5) not set
aside for public use, (6) no enhancement of a governmental enterprise, (7) no physical
321
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The essential idea of the limitation on taking private property with-
out compensation is that while the individual is expected to yield cer-
tain property interests without compensation to governmental actions
which pass the minimal standards of propriety, if the burden on a sin-
gle individual exceeds the amount that one may fairly be expected to
bear,3' compensation must be paid. 32 The various factors considered
relevant to the question of taking without compensation can be
classified into four basic elements which comprise the concept of fair-
ness.
The first is the element of distribution. When a burden is fairly dis-
tributed throughout the community, compensation is never required.
This is the essence of a tax.33 As the burden is confined to fewer peo-
ple the need for compensation grows.3 4
The second element is the quality of the taken property interest.
For example, while compensation is usually required when a recog-
nized estate in land is taken,3 5 compensation is seldom required when
invasion, (8) no discrimination, (9) rational relationship between means and end. ( 10)
no prohibition of all profitable use, and ( 11) the state did not create the necessity for
regulation. Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology. 88 Wn. 2d 726. 733-
34, 565 P.2d 1162, 1165-66(1977).
31. When the theory of compensation is viewed from this perspective, it follows that
the amount of compensation that the government should pay is only the increment by
which the individual's burden exceeds the amount he is expected to bear without com-
pensation. Each case could be seen as involving part eminent domain and part police
power, so that only part of the deprivation would have to be compensated. See Stoe-
buck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 607 (1972). A
practical solution to the problem of placing a value on each of the parts could save large
amounts of money for local governments who take the compensable regulation ap-
proach. See notes 5 1-52 and accompanying text infra.
32. The Wisconsin court has expressed the essential idea very well:
[I] f the damage is such as to be suffered by many similarly situated ... and ought
to be borne by the individual as a member of society for the good of the public
safety, health or general welfare, it is said to be a reasonable exercise of the police
power, but if the damage is so great to the individual that he ought not to bear it un-
der contemporary standards, then courts are inclined to treat it as a "taking ....
Stefan Auto Body v. State Highway Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 363, 124 N.W.2d 319. 323
(1963),
33. See Stoebuck, supra note 3 1, at 571-72.
34. The element of the distribution of the burden has a parallel consideration in the
distribution of the benefit. When the benefits are conferred upon a very small group, the
action is improper as a use of government power for private benefit; or at least, if com-
pensation is due to those who are burdened, it should be paid by the private beneficiar-
ies. As the number of beneficiaries increases, the duty of the beneficiaries to pay de-
creases. If the number of beneficiaries is great enough, the benefits are considered
public rather than private. Contra, W. STOEBUCK, supra note 6, at 201 (all benefits are
private except those which directly benefit government-owned land).
35. E.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (right to mine
subsurface minerals cannot be taken without compensation).
322
Balancing: Due Process or Just Compensation
a nuisance or source of harm to society is regulated. 36
The third element, quantity, is expressed in the diminution in value
test 37 promulgated by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.38 When the diminution in property value suffered by a single
property owner becomes excessive, she is entitled to compensation. 39
This element includes both the idea that all landowners can be ex-
pected to yield de minimus property rights for the benefit of all, and
the notion that compensation should not be paid when settlement (or
transaction) costs exceed the benefits. 40
The fourth is the element of reliance. When a landowner had actual
or constructive notice of impending regulations before he purchased
his land, it seems fair to deny compensation. 41 Likewise, when a land-
36. See Kusler, supra note 7, at 22-28; Michelman, supra note 7, at 1196-201. In
1904, Professor Freund expressed another quality consideration:
[T] he state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to the public,
and under the police power because it is harmful.... From this results the differ-
ence between the power of eminent domain and the police power, that the former
recognizes a right to compensation, while the latter on principle does not.
E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 511, at 546-47 (1904).
The harm-to-society/benefit-to-society distinction is sometimes elusive because the
elimination of a harm can often be viewed as the conferral of a benefit. For example, if
local authorities require the draining of a mosquito breeding swamp on private land, is
society benefited by the reduction in mosquitoes or has the harm of mosquitoes been
eliminated?
A theory offered by Professor Sax also examines the quality element: no compensa-
tion is required if the government is arbitrating between conflicting adjacent land uses
rather than conducting a government enterprise. Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149 (197 1).
37. For discussions of the diminution in value test, see F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 6,
at 208- 1l; Berger, supra note 6, at 175-77; Kusler, supra note 7, at 33-34; Mercer,
Regulation (Police Power) v. Taking (Eminent Domain), 6 N.C. CENT. LJ. 177, 186
(1975); Michelman, supra note 7, at 1190-93; Plater, supra note 7, at 228-36; Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 50 (1964).
38. "When [the extent of diminution] reaches a certain magnitude, in most...
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act." 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). This test has been reaffirmed in dicta. Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
39. But the standard for judging the extent of diminution has never been clarified.
Some of the possible standards to which the diminution in value can be compared are:
(1) the total value of the property, (2) the wealth of the owner, (3) the extent of uncom-
pensated burdens imposed upon other landowners, and (4) a given amount in constant
dollars. The total value of the property is often assumed to be the standard, but this still
leaves unresolved issues. For example, is it the value of the entire tract, or only the
value of the portion affected by the restriction? See Michelman, supra note 7, at 1192.
40. See Berger, supra note 6, at 201 ("Compensation should not be paid unless the
damage ... is substantially more than the cost of administering payment"); Michelman,
supra note 7, at 1215 ("compensation is due whenever demoralization costs exceed set-
tlement costs").
41. This element includes the first-in-time approach advocated by Professor Berger
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owner has justifiably relied on existing zoning of his own or sur-
rounding land, it seems fair to compensate him for changes which ac-
tually cause financial losses.42
All of these four elements-distribution, quality, quantity, and reli-
ance-relate to the issue of fairness. Addressing these elements will
facilitate analysis of the compensation issue, although the problem re-
mains of evaluating the factors within each element and deciding
which elements should carry the most weight.
C. Distinguishing a Taking Without Due Process from a Taking
Without Compensation
The literal meanings of the words in the due process and compen-
sation clauses of the Constitution give few clues to the content of the
protections as they have been construed by the United States Supreme
Court.43 One may at first fail to discern any theoretical or philosophi-
cal reason that either clause should have the content it has been given.
But it appears that the Supreme Court opinions have been reaching
toward two logically distinct, complementary limitations in an at-
tempt to construct a coherent set of legal principles which reflects cul-
tural notions of justice. That is, because all individuals must yield
some property rights for the good of society, two different limitations
are required to protect against improper exertions of governmental
power to take private property.
The first limitation, the minimal requirement of substantive due
process, focuses on the taking of individual property rights where no
for dealing with adjacent conflicting land uses. Berger. supra note 6. at 193. 195-226.
Under this approach, if a regulation proscribes a land use which started after passage of
the regulation, no compensation is required because the investor had notice of the con-
flict. whereas if the regulation proscribes a prior land use, compensation is required be-
cause the investor justifiably relied on the lack of conflict with surrounding uses.
42. Compensation should be based on principles of restitution, measured by actual
losses, rather than expectation. measured by lost profits or "benefit of the bargain." If
the zoning authority downzones an area, the landowners should not be allowed to re-
cover the profits they expected to make through improvements or market appreciation,
but they should be compensated for actual losses (with fair interest) when they sell the
downzoned property.
The commentators do not agree on the proper role for the landowner's expectations
in taking theory. Sax, supra note 36, at 180- 81 (197 1). suggests that expectations should
not be considered: Berger, supra note 6, at 174. argues that expectations are a critical
factor, and Michelman. supra note 7, at 1211-14, suggests a trade-off between the
values of respecting expectations and the need for progress in land use patterns. But
none of the authors considers the distinction between restitution based on justifiable
reliance and payment for lost expectations.
43. See, e.g., note 20 supra.
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compensation is required and asks whether the government has acted
properly. The second limitation, the compensation requirement, con-
siders whether the government has taken more from an individual
than he should fairly be expected to give up without compensation.
Perhaps because the compensation clause has been incorporated
into the due process clause,44 and perhaps because both constitutional
protections apply to governmental actions which take property inter-
ests, courts45 and commentators46 have failed to distinguish the two
limitations. In many decisions, it is difficult to know which limitation
is being considered, and it appears that the two have often been
merged into a single standard. 47 An examination of the language used
44. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
45. For example, in LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 12 III. 2d 40, 145
N.E.2d 65. 69 (1957), while considering whether an ordinance bore a real and substan-
tial relation to the general welfare, the court listed six factors deemed relevant to this
determination. Eight years later, in a case between the same parties, a lower court con-
sidered both the minimal due process and compensation issues and cited the six factors
from the earlier case while examining the compensation issue. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v.
County of Cook, 60 Ill. App. 2d 39, 208 N.E.2d 430, 436 (1965).
46. Typically, authors focus only on the fifth amendment's prohibition against tak-
ing private property without just compensation. E.g., F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 6, at
Frontfly, Preface at i; Kusler, supra note 7, at 2-3; Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 7,
at 596-97, 601-02. The due process issue is often ignored in the analysis of cases. For
example, the authors of The Taking Issue present the "real and substantial relation" re-
quirement in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888), as a test for a taking without
compensation, F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 6, at 121, and in the chapter on taking by reg-
ulation, they quote judicial requirements of a "substantial relationship," id. at 190, and
a "rational basis," id. at 193, without mentioning due process or the fourteenth amend-
ment. Although one author recognizes three different sources of constitutional
limitations on taking private property-due process, equal protection, and "taking,"
Kusler, supra note 7, at 13-the body of his article focuses on "factors relevant to the
question of taking." Id. at 20. When he states that "[t] he typical judicial test [for a tak-
ing without compensation] balances the harm posed to society. . . against the impact
of the regulations upon the usability of the parcel," id., he cites cases that use balancing
to test for the minimal requirements of due process: Town of Caledonia v. Racine
Limestone Co., 266 Wis. 475, 479, 63 N.W.2d 697, 699 (1954) and Miller Bros. Lumber
Co. v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 162, 111 N.E.2d 149 (1953), id. The research for this
comment has produced only one article which focuses on the due process issue: Donald-
son, Regulation of Conduct in Relation to Land-The Need to Purge Natural Law
Constraints from the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 187 (1974).
47. Justice Stevens noted this phenomenon of merger: "In his opinion for the Court,
Mr. Justice Sutherland fused the two express constitutional restrictions on any state in-
terference with private property-that property shall not be taken without due process
nor for a public purpose without just compensation- into a single standard .... "
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring, dis-
cussing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). In another example, a state
court stated:
[The police power] cannot be exercised unless it bears a rational relationship to
the subjects which fall fairly within the police power and unless the means used are
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is often of little help because the same words, especially "taking,"
"confiscatory," and "unreasonable," are frequently used for both limi-
tations. 48 The only words that seem to be useful in determining which
limitation the Court actually applied are: "compensation" 4 9 for the
limitation that focuses on fairness for the individual, and "arbitrary,"
"capricious," "public purpose," and "rational relationship"5 0 for the
limitation that focuses on the propriety of government actions.
Does it matter that the limitations are often merged? One might
argue that, as long as all the relevant tests for both limitations are ap-
plied, the proper finding on the question of constitutionality will al-
ways be reached. This is true, but the possible remedies for the two
constitutional violations are not the same. A taking without compen-
sation can be corrected by payment, but a governmental action that is
arbitrary or serves no valid public purpose must be voided. The Mod-
el Land Development Code5 ' and some commentators52 encourage
allowing the government the option of paying to correct the defect
without further proceedings when a regulation is found to constitute a
not within constitutional inhibitions. The means will fall within these inhibitions
whenever they are destructive. confiscatory or so unreasonable as to be arbitrary.
Horowitz v. Town of Waterford. 151 Conn. 323, 197 A.2d 636. 637-38 (1964) (empha-
sis added).
48. -'Taking" has been used while discussing the compensation issue, Sibson v.
State, 115 N.H. 124. 336 A.2d 239, 241 (1975). and while discussing the due process is-
sue. Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 374 A.2d 954, 956, 958 (N.H. 1977).
"'Confiscatory" has been used while discussing the compensation issue. Dooley v.
Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n. 151 Conn. 309, 197 A.2d 770. 772. 775 (1964). and
while discussing the due process issue. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.. 272 U.S.
365. 386 (1926); C. Miller Chevrolet, Inc. v. City of Willoughby Hills, 38 Ohio St. 2d
298. 313 N.E.2d 400, 405 (1974).
"Unreasonable" has been used while discussing the compensation issue. Stefan Auto
Body v. State Highway Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 363, 124 N.W.2d 319. 323 (1963). and
while discussing the due process issue, Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.H. 71. 95 A.2d 122.
124. 125 (1953); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d
891 (1972). cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
49. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.. 357 U.S. 155 (1958): Pennsylva-
nia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922): Just v. Marinette County. 56 Wis. 2d 7.
201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972). Because both limitations concern the taking of property
rights, the term "taking," which is used by many authors, should be avoided as ambigu-
ous. "'Compensation" is a much clearer distinguishing label and has been used through-
out this comment.
50. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32, 33 (1954) ("public purpose"): Washington
ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121, 122 (1928) ("substantial
relation," "arbitrarily," "caprice"); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183. 187.
188 (1928) ("arbitrary." "substantial relation").
51. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 9- 112(3) (1976).
52. F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 6, at 302-09; Kusler, supra note 7, at 75-79.
326
Balancing: Due Process or Just Compensation
taking without compensation. The adoption of this plan would make
imperative the careful distinction53 between these two limitations.
III. PROPER USE OF BALANCING PRIVATE LOSS
AGAINST PUBLIC GAIN TO TEST
FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS
OF PROPERTY
A. United States Supreme Court Precedent
Although state courts have used the test of balancing private loss
against public gain to determine constitutionality under both the due
process and the compensation clauses,54 whether and how it has been
used by the United States Supreme Court is debatable. Two authors, 55
53. In a lengthy opinion, the Maryland Federal District Court carefully distin-
guished the two issues: "The fifth amendment employs two independent clauses to ad-
dress two independent issues.... [A] claim of deprivation of property without due pro-
cess cannot be blended as one and the same with the claim that property has been taken
for public use, without just compensation." Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban
San. Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369. 1381 (D. Md. 1975) (emphasis by the court).
In Czech v. Blaine, 253 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 1977), the Supreme Court of Minnesota
recognized the importance of this distinction. The trial court had voided an action of the
city council under due process because it was capricious. The supreme court vacated
this judgment, finding instead an unconstitutional taking without compensation.
54. The following courts appear to have expressed the test of balancing private loss
against public gain to determine whether requirements of due process have been vio-
lated: Guhl v. Holcomb Bridge Road Corp., 238 Ga. 322. 232 S.E. 2d 830 (1977); Tillit-
son v. City of Urbana, 29 Ill. 2d 22, 193 N.E.2d 1 (1963); Franz v. Village of Morton
Grove, 28 II1. 2d 246, 190 N.E.2d 790, 792 (1963); Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of
Gaithersburg, 266 Md. 117, 291 A.2d 672 (1972); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Ded-
ham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Huttig
v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963); Metzger v. Town of
Brentwood, 374 A.2d 954 (N.H. 1977); Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.H. 71, 95 A.2d 122
(1953); Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949); C.
Miller Chevrolet, Inc. v. City of Willoughby Hills, 38 Ohio St. 2d 298, 313 N.E.2d 400
(1974).
The following courts expressed balancing private loss against public gain as a test for
a taking without compensation: Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Environmental
Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of
Cook, 60 I1. App. 2d 39, 208 N.E.2d 430 (1965); Rochester Business Inst. v. City of
Rochester, 25 App. Div. 2d 97, 267 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966); Department of Ecology v.
Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wn. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977).
55. F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 6, at 139, 207, 238, 256; Kratovil & Harrison, supra
note 7, at 609. It is likely that Kratovil and Harrison began the misconception about
Pennsylvania Coal in 1954 because theirs is the oldest citation to this case for the bal-
ancing idea and their other citations for balancing, Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of
West Orange, 120 NJ.L. 145, 198 A. 225, 230 (1938) and Reschke v. Village of Win-
netka, 363 III. 478, 2 N.E.2d 718 (1936), mentioned only state cases.
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and courts in two jurisdictions, 56 cite Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon5 7 as Supreme Court authority for the proposition that balanc-
ing private loss against public gain is a proper test for deciding when
compensation must be paid. Two other commentators conclude that
the balancing test was not used by Justice Holmes, 58 but apparently
no one has presented a complete analysis of this case. Although the
opinion is not entirely clear, it appears that while considering the con-
stitutionality of one application of the statute, Justice Holmes bal-
anced private loss against public gain as a test for substantive due pro-
cess, and, while considering the constitutionality of another
application of the statute, he examined the extent of value diminution
to test for a taking without just compensation.
In Pennsylvania Coal, Mahon, a private citizen, sought to enforce a
new statute regulating coal mining which would prevent mining under
his house that might cause the surface to subside. After a brief intro-
duction to the concept of police power and its limitations, the Court
presented its opinion in two parts. It first considered the statute's ap-
plication to the land under Mahon's house, the only question before
the Court. Then, because the state attorney general and other inter-
ested parties had participated in the hearings below, it gratuitously
offered its opinion on the constitutionality of the statute's application
to land under public streets and cities in the second part.59 The anal-
yses in these two parts are entirely different: the first primarily in-
volved benefits for private landowners and the second involved large
benefits for the public.
In the first part, the Court examined the legislative objective for a
public purpose and merely presumed that the protection of this single
56. Rochester Business Inst. v. City of Rochester, 25 App. Div. 2d 97. 267 N.Y.S.2d
274, 279 (1966); Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wn. 2d 203. 209,
571 P.2d 196, 194 (1977), Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology. 88 Wn.
2d 726, 731, 565 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1977).
57. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
58. P. BROWN, supra note 7, at 18; Mercer, supra note 37, at 189.
59. The Court stated:
If we were to deal with the plaintiffs position alone we should think it clear that the
statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a de-
struction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights.
But the case has been treated as one in which the general validity of the act
should be discussed. The attorney general of the state, the city of Scranton, and the
representatives of other extensive interests, were allowed to take part in the argu-
ment below, and have submitted their contentions here. It seems therefore, to be
our duty to go farther in the statement of our opinion, in order that it be known at
once, and that further suits should not be brought in vain.
260 U.S. 393,414 (1922).
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private house involves some public interest because the public has an
interest in everything that happens within the commonwealth. 60 The
Court then observed that the presumed public interest was small be-
cause there was no public nuisance, the damage was not public, the
statute did not apply to all land with houses, and personal safety was
not involved.61 Next, it noted that a valuable estate in land was abol-
ished and concluded "that the statute does not disclose a public inter-
est sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's
constitutionally protected rights,"' ' 2 indicating that the means em-
ployed by the statute were too harsh and not justified by the end to be
achieved. The quoted passage clearly requires a comparison between
public interest and private loss, and it is only a small step from this to
an analytic balancing between private loss and public gain.
In this part of the opinion the Court did not mention the possibility
of compensation or eminent domain. Its observation that there was
little public interest involved effectively precluded the option of pay-
ing compensation because eminent domain cannot be exercised at
public expense for only private benefit.63 The Court's approach, con-
sidering first whether there was a valid public purpose and then
whether the result of the statute was suited to accomplishing that pub-
lic purpose, followed the usual pattern of application of the means-
ends test for the minimal requirements of substantive due process. 64
By contrast, in the second part of the opinion, the Court assumed
that there was a sufficient public interest in protecting the streets and
cities to warrant the exercise of eminent domain 65 and repeatedly em-
phasized the option of compensation. 66 This implies that the Court
found the act to be sufficiently related to a public purpose to pass the
minimal requirements of substantive due process. The Court applied
the value diminution test 67 to determine whether these same objec-
60. Id. at 413.
61. Id.at413-14.
62. Id. at 414. The Court considered only the public interest in protecting Mahon's
house and no other property.
63. "The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it
is wanted for public use." Id. at 415.
64. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
65. "[W] e assume that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of emi-
nent domain." 260 U.S. at 416.
66. The Court mentioned the idea of compensation five times in the second half. Id.
at 415-16. "The rights of the public in a street purchased or laid out by eminent domain
are those it has paid for." Id. at 416.
67. "[W] hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415. "One fact for consideration ... is the
extent of the diminution." Id. at 413. "[This statute which] make [s] it commercially
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tives could be accomplished without compensation and concluded
that the state was required to pay for the change. It did not evaluate
the benefits to the public, a prerequisite to balancing private loss
against public gain, and twice stated that large public benefits cannot
justify denying compensation, 8 an explicit refusal to apply this bal-
ancing test to the question of taking without compensation.
The sharp difference in approach between the two parts of the
opinion suggests that Justice Holmes had two different limitations in
mind. The first part focused on the propriety of the governmental ac-
tion while the second part focused on the burden imposed on the regu-
lated landowners.69
impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect ... as appropriating or
destroying it." Id. at 414.
68. "[W] e see no more authority [for taking the right to support] without compen-
sation than there was for taking the right of way [which was paid for] and refusing to
pay for it because the public wanted it very much." Id. at 415. "We are in danger of
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for
the change." Id. at 416.
69. Dicta from another case support the conclusion that the United States Supreme
Court approves of balancing private loss against public gain to test for the minimal re-
quirements of substantive due process. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962), the owner of a gravel pit challenged the constitutionality of a restriction on
dredging and pit excavating. The Court considered separately the questions of a taking
without compensation and "reasonableness," a requirement of substantive due process:
How far a regulation may go before it becomes a taking we need not now decide..
. . [W] e find no indication that the prohibitory effect of Ordinance No. 16 is suffi-
cient to render it an unconstitutional taking if it is otherwise a valid police regula-
tion.
The question, therefore, narrows to whether the prohibition ... is a valid exercise
of the town's police power .... Except for the substitution of the familiar standard
of "reasonableness," this Court has generally refrained from announcing any spe-
cific criteria.
Id. at 594.
Although the Court found the record insufficient to overcome the presumption in
favor of the state, id. at 595, it identified the information needed for evaluating the "rea-
sonableness" of the ordinance: "we therefore need to know such things as the nature of
the menace against which it will protect . . . and the loss which appellants will suffer
from the imposition of the ordinance," id., implying that if the loss were greater than the
menace, the ordinance would be unreasonable and would violate substantive due pro-
cess.
In Dahl v. City of Palo Alto. 372 F. Supp. 647, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1974). a federal court
read the Goldblatt case to require a balancing of "the interests of the public" against
"the oppressiveness of the action" to determine the question of reasonableness. How-
ever, it misconstrued Goldblatt when it stated that the determination of "where regula-
tion ends and taking begins" is "a question of reasonableness."
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B. Justification for Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain
to Test for a Violation of Due Process
Balancing private loss against public gain is justified as a test for
due process by four different considerations. First, as a form of social
cost-benefit analysis, this test requires that all governmental actions
provide some benefit to society by increasing aggregate welfare.70
This goes to the heart of substantive due process, which requires that
all governmental actions meet minimal standards of propriety. Al-
though there are serious limitations on the objectivity of this test, it
may serve in some cases as a more manageable and objective judicial
standard than the usual catchwords such as arbitrary, capricious, pub-
lic purpose, and rational relationship.
Second, in contrast to the other forms of social cost-benefit analy-
sis, the test of balancing private loss against public gain includes an
additional requirement of creating public benefits rather than only
private benefits,71 another element of substantive due process.72
Third, balancing private loss against public gain is an appropriate
test for the adequacy of the means in the means-ends test. The United
States Supreme Court has held that an examination of the means al-
lows scrutiny of the actual results of the statute's application and not
just the face of the act.73 The Court requires that the actual results of
a land use ordinance genuinely promote health, safety, convenience,
or general welfare,74 and social cost-benefit analysis tests for just this
requirement.75 Balancing is therefore an appropriate test for the
means requirement, which all legislation affecting private property
must pass.7 6
Fourth, balancing private loss against public gain, like all forms of
social cost-benefit analysis, is an appropriate test for some of the
catchwords 77 enunciated by courts as standards for the minimal re-
70. See notes 9-15 and accompanying text supra.
71. This is the public purpose requirement. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text
supra.
72. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
73. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-97 (1926).
74. "Here, the express finding of the master. . . is that the health, safety, conven-
ience, and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of the city affected will not be
promoted by . . . the ordinance . . . . This finding . . . is determinative of the case."
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
75. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
76. Because all legislation must pass the means-ends test, see note 24 supra, social
cost-benefit analysis is an appropriate minimal test for the constitutionality of all legis-
lation.
77. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
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quirements of substantive due process, such as "unnecessary" and
"unreasonable." A law which does not in some way increase the gen-
eral welfare is clearly "unnecessary." Many state courts have balanced
private loss against public gain as a test for "reasonableness" under
substantive due process.78 A good example is Richardson v. Beattie,79
in which a regulation prohibiting boating on a public pond to protect
the purity of a water supply was challenged as unreasonable by ripar-
ian landowners who were specially affected. The court stated:
In passing upon the reasonableness of legislation . . . the court is re-
quired to balance the importance of the public benefit which is sought
to be promoted against the seriousness of the restriction of private
right sought to be imposed ...... [T] he more insistent the public
need the more may private rights be restricted."'80
Noting that the problem was easily solved by chlorination, 81 the court
held that because the burdens on adjoining landowners outweighed
the benefits for the public, the regulation was void as unreasonable. 82
These four justifications for balancing private loss against public
gain to test for a violation of due process have all presumed a context
of challenges to actions of legislatures or their subordinate bodies. In
these situations, unless certain provisions of the Bill of Rights or cer-
tain other fundamental interests are violated, the courts must give
broad deference to the legislative valuation of gains and losses.83 But,
without challenging the legislative judgment, the court can use those
same valuations to invalidate legislation under a social cost-benefit
analysis in two situations.
First, the legislature cannot foresee all possible applications of a
statute which will affect each individual differently. If, in a particular
situation, the court finds that, according to the legislative valuations,
the public benefits are smaller than the private burdens, the court may
invalidate that application as inconsistent with the legislative intent.84
78. E.g., Franz v. Village of Morton Grove. 28 III. 2d 246, 190 N.E.2d 790 (1963):
Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City ofGaithersburg. 266 Md. 117. 291 A.2d 672 (1972):
Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963); Richardson v. Beattie.
98 N.H. 71. 95 A.2d 122 (1953).
79. 98N.H. 71.95A.2d 122(1953).
80. 95 A.2d at 125 (citations omitted).
81. Id.
82. 95 A.2d at 126. The compensation issue was not considered in this case.
83. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. Of course state courts may enforce
the due process provisions in their own constitutions as they choose.
84. E.g., Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776. 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335
(1963) (one-acre minimum lot size was unduly oppressive when parcel was surrounded
by smaller lots and no public benefit would accrue); Reynolds v. Barrett. 12 Cal. 2d
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Second, in the legislative process, a majority receiving small bene-
fits can impose large burdens on a minority. By applying the legisla-
tive valuations, a court can invalidate this type of statute with a social
cost-benefit analysis as serving no public purpose and not increasing
the general welfare.85
An exercise of eminent domain must also serve a public purpose 86
and meet the requirements of due process. If the condemnation con-
fers no benefits on private parties, the test of balancing private loss
against public gain is the same as a social cost-benefit analysis, 87 and,
because the landowner is presumed to be fairly compensated, this test
requires only that the benefits to the public exceed the costs. 88 This is
usually the case, since public officials use cost-benefit analysis in deci-
sionmaking. But if the test is not satisfied, evidencing an improper
governmental action, a court should invalidate the exercise of eminent
domain as serving no public purpose.
C. Conflict Between Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain
and the Principles of Just Compensation
Balancing private loss against public gain has been shown to be a
suitable test for due process, and it remains to be demonstrated why
this test is not also a suitable indicator for the requirement of compen-
sation. This section will show that this use of the balancing test is in-
consistent with the clear meaning of the Constitution, violates the ba-
sic principle of fairness behind the compensation requirement,
contradicts doctrine enunciated in Pennsylvania Coal, and denies
government the remedy of paying compensation.
The words of the Constitution clearly intend that compensation
must accompany the taking of property in some situations. Use of the
balancing test would allow any property to be taken without compen-
244, 83 P.2d 29, 33 (1938) (although the general ordinance was valid, residential zoning
of parcel surrounded by businesses was unconstitutional because " [ t] o hold otherwise
would be to needlessly injure plaintiffs, without a compensating benefit to the public").
85. For example, if there are two dominant crops in an agricultural district, and the
minority's crop nurtures a pest for the majority's crop, the majority may pass a law pro-
hibiting cultivation of the other crop. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)
(rust from cedar trees attacked apple orchard). If the resulting economic loss to the mi-
nority exceeds the economic benefits for the majority, the law should be declared uncon-
stitutional as damaging to the general welfare. See Michelman, supra note 7, at 1195.
86. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See Stoebuck, supra note 31, at 588-99.
87. See text accompanying notes I 1-17 supra.
88. If the compensation is "just," it should exactly balance the individual losses,
leaving only gains and losses for the rest of society in the formula. See generally Michel-
man, supra note 7, at 1195.
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sation if the public benefits are great enough. 89 Would not the public
benefits of a new school house be greater than the value of the land on
which it is built?
Commentators agree that fairness must be the guiding principle be-
hind any resolution of the issue of taking without compensation. :10
Fairness requires that property owners who are similarly situated and
restricted by identical regulations be treated alike. Because the test of
balancing private loss against public gain considers distant public
benefits, a factor unrelated to the landowner's type or extent of bur-
den, it violates this requirement. For example, in the Richardson!,'
case discussed above, if the riparian landowners had alleged a taking
without just compensation, this use of the test would have indicated a
need for compensation since the public benefit was adjudged smaller
than their losses. On the other hand, if the same activities by boaters
had caused a greater contamination problem with more harm to the
distant public, no compensation would have been required. In these
two hypotheticals the landowners are similarly situated but the ques-
tion of compensation is determined solely by a factor which is unre-
lated to the landowners' situation, the magnitude of benefits for the
public. This differing treatment violates fairness.
Balancing private loss against public gain to test for a taking with-
out compensation contradicts two doctrines enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal. First, public need, no
matter how strong, cannot justify taking private property without
compensationt 2 and second, in most cases, when the extent of value
diminution is great enough, compensation is required. :J3 The use of
89. See Stoebuck. The Property Right of Access Versus the Power of Eminent Do-
main, 47 TEX. L. REV. 733, 748 (1969) (comment on the obvious problem with using the
balancing test in the area of compensation for loss of highway access).
90. See Berger, supra note 6, at 167-69; Dunham. Griggs v. Allegheny County in
Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REV.
63, 81 n.53 (1962); M ichelman, supra note 7. at 1171-72.
91. Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.H. 71. 95 A.2d 122 (1953) (discussed in text accom-
panying notes 79-82 supra).
92. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 416 (1922). See note 68
and accompanying text supra.
93. 260 U.S. at 413. 415. See note 67 and accompanying text supra. Some commen-
tators have confused the test of balancing private loss against public gain with the value
diminution test. For example, the authors of The Taking Issue, while exploring the pri-
vate loss side of balancing private loss against public gain. quoted studies based on
cases involving only the value diminution test. F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 6, at 208- Il.
Plater combined the two tests to create a single "diminution-balancing test." Plater. su-
pra note 7. at 243-56.
In the controversy over the appropriate standard for the value diminution test. Pro-
fessor Allison Dunham suggested that the diminution is excessive when the private cost
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balancing violates both of these doctrines by allowing property values
to be completely destroyed without compensation if the public interest
is great enough. Note that both of these doctrines favor equal treat-
ment for similarly situated landowners by focusing only on factors re-
lated to the landowners' situation.
An essential characteristic of a violation of the compensation re-
quirement is that payment to the landowner will remedy the defect9 4
Testing for the requirement of compensation by balancing private loss
against public gain would deny this remedy because no amount of
compensation can correct a failure of this balancing test. Any money
paid by the government is a public cost which reduces the net public
benefits. This reduction in public gain is exactly equal to the reduc-
tion in private loss to the landowner, so the balancing test still will not
be satisfied.
In cases concerning the compensation issue it is important to distin-
guish an application of balancing private loss against public gain from
a consideration of the element of the quality of the property rights
taken. 5 The confusion often arises in cases involving a nuisance or
source of harm to society, like the wetlands cases96 in which landown-
ers are prohibited, without compensation, from filling marshlands be-
cause of the resulting damage to the ecosystem. In some of these
cases, although the courts note the extent of the public interest which
motivated the legislation, the decisions properly turn on the fact that
the regulation prevents a harm to society rather than securing a
gain.:97 For example, in Just v. Marinette County98 the Wisconsin
court observed: "[W] e have a restriction on the use of a citizen's
property, not to secure a benefit for the public, but to prevent a harm
exceeds the public need. But this then becomes the balancing test which can sustain a
regulation no matter how large the diminution. Dunham, supra note 90, at 76.
94. This is the approach taken in the second part of the Pennsylvania Coal opinion.
See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
96. E.g., Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891
(1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239
(1975); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7,201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
97. In a recent New Hampshire case the court wrote: "'It is not an appropriation of
the property to a public use, but the restraint of an injurious private use by the owner,
and is therefore not within the principles of property taken under the right of eminent
domain.'" Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239, 242 (1972) (quoting Com-
monwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 86 (1851)). Note that the court's mention of
balancing private loss against public gain was only by analogy to cases which had
clearly used it to test for the minimal requirements of substantive due process. This
reading of Sibson was affirmed in Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 374 A.2d 954 (N.H.
1977).
98. 56Wis. 2d 7,201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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from the change in the natural character of the citizen's property." 9
The court therefore concluded that no compensation was required. Of
course, in addition to considering the quality of the rights taken, a
court should consider the magnitude of the public interest, because, if
it is insufficient to justify the burdens on the landowners, the court
should find a violation of the minimal requirements of substantive due
process.
IV. SUMMARY
As a contributing rationale for deciding challenges to the constitu-
tionality of land use regulations, many courts have applied the test of
balancing private loss against public gain. This test is one of many
possible formulations of a cost-benefit analysis for all of society, a
method of predicting increases or decreases in aggregate welfare re-
sulting from a proposed action. This particular formulation of social
cost-benefit analysis includes a further limitation that incidental spe-
cial benefits to private parties cannot be counted to help satisfy the
test. If a state action fails this test the courts conclude that it violates
the federal or state constitution. However, the courts do not agree on
which provision is violated. Some find a violation of the fifth amend-
ment's prohibition against taking private property without compensa-
tion, while others find a deprivation of private property without due
process of law violating the substantive requirements of the due pro-
cess clause in the fourteenth amendment.
The distinction between these two limitations, which is seldom
recognized in judicial opinions,10 0 is fundamental. Beginning with the
99. 201 N.W.2d at 767-68.
100. This author has found two exemplary state court opinions that distinguish the
two constitutional limitations and use the balancing test properly. In Rockville Fuel &
Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 266 Md. 117, 291 A.2d 672 11972), the court properly
distinguished the taking and due process limitations when it stated:
Rockville Fuel does not contend ... that the zoning amendment ... would amount
to a taking of its land for public use without the payment of just compensation ....
The question then is whether or not the amendatory zoning ordinance is uncon-
stitutional as being arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious or discriminatory and thus
a violation of the provisions of... the Maryland Constitution prohibiting a denial
of due process of law and the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
291 A.2d at 677. The court then quoted with approval the opinion of the court below.
which applied balancing to determine whether the ordinance was unreasonable and ar-
bitrary: " ' [T] he City Council could have found that cement mixing plants ... so seri-
ously incommoded the health. comfort and general welfare that the benefit to the public
good brought about by their removal.., substantially outweighed the resulting harm to
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premise that all individuals are expected to yield some property inter-
ests without compensation for the good of all, it can be shown that
two distinct, complementary limitations on governmental power to
take property rights are required. The minimal requirements of sub-
stantive due process ensure that all governmental deprivations of
property meet certain standards of propriety whether or not compen-
sation is required, and the compensation provision ensures that a
property owner will be paid if his burden exceeds that which an indi-
vidual is expected to yield without compensation. It is important that
courts distinguish these limitations because a violation of the compen-
sation requirement is correctable by government payment while an
action that is improper for any other reason must be voided.
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court and the theory be-
hind the principles that underlie each limitation indicate that balanc-
ing private loss against public gain is an appropriate test for a viola-
tion of substantive due process but unjustifiable as a test for an
unconstitutional taking without compensation. As a form of social
cost-benefit analysis, this test identifies actions that do not serve a
public purpose and, therefore, violate due process. If applied to the
compensation issue, this test contravenes the principle of fairness
which is fundamental to that constitutional limitation.
Jeffrey T. Haley
individuals.'" 291 A.2d at 679.
In Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963), the due process
analysis began with the statements that the restriction must not be "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable" and must "bear a substantial relation to the public ... welfare." Id. at
839. The court noted that value diminution is "'an element to be considered, particularly
in ascertaining the relationship of the zoning to the public welfare," id. at 840, and con-
cluded that the basic question was "[I] s the extent of the public interest and welfare
great enough to outweigh the demonstrated detriment to the individual interests... ?"
Id. at 842. Finding that the benefits for the neighborhood were small compared to the
plaintiffs' burden, the court concluded that the zoning bore "no substantial relationship
to the public ... welfare." Id. at 843. It held this to be a violation of "the due process
clauses... of both the State and Federal Constitutions," id., and then stated: "Having so
ruled, it is unnecessary to pass specifically upon the additional [contention] that ...
plaintiffs' property is taken without compensation .... Id.
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